Osmond Lane Homeowners Association, an unincorporated association v. George C. Landrith, Jr. : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Osmond Lane Homeowners Association, an
unincorporated association v. George C. Landrith,
Jr. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Russell A. Cline; Crippen & Cline; attorney for appellant.
Thomas W. Seiler; Robinson, Seiler & Anderson; attorney for appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Osmond Lane Homeowners v. Landrith, No. 20090157 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1533
UTATT COURT OF APPEALS 
OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated 
association, 
'\ppelkv Plauilifl 
vs. 
GEORGE C. LANDRITH, JR., 
Appell.ml Defendant. 
Appeal No ^OO'XI! 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLAN1 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Crippen & Cline 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, L.C. 
2500 N. University Ave. 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603 
Attorney for Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
APR 1 5 2010 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OSMOND LANE HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated 
association, 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGE C. LANDRITH, JR. 
Appellant/Defendant. 
Appeal No. 20090157 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
Crippen & Cline 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, L.C. 
2500 N. University Ave. 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
DISCUSSION 1 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING THE 
ASSOCIATION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 
A. The Association's claim that it "acted as the governing body 
pursuant to the Declaration for 27 years" is not supported 
by the evidence. 1 
B. The Association's claim that other property owners have 
"recognized and ratified" the Association as having authority 
to act under the Declaration is not supported by the evidence.. 4 
C. The Association's claim that Landrith has "ratified" the 
Association as having authority to Act under the Declaration 
is not supported by the evidence. 5 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN DENYING LANDRITH'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 7 
III. SECTION 8.4 OF THE DECLARATION IS INAPPLICABLE IN 
THIS CASE 8 
IV. THE COURT ERRORED IN EXCLUDING RILEY BRATT AS AN 
EXPERT WITNESS 9 
A. It was not necessary to be an engineer for Mr. Bratt to testify 
that a rock retaining wall would have satisfactorily resolved 
the erosion issue. 11 
B. Mr. Bratt did not need to visit the site before the two retaining 
walls were constructed. 11 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING THE 
ASSOCIATION'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 12 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont) 
A. The trial court errored in granting the Association's motion 
for directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of failure to 
mitigate damages. 12 
(i) The Association breached its duty to mitigate damages 
by refusing to allow Landrith to fix the hole. 12 
(ii) Failure to use less expensive alternative means. 14 
B. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to 
Landrith's defense of material breach by the Association. 14 
(i) No approved plans. 15 
(ii) No notice of entry of the Property. 16 
(iii) No vote authorizing the $1,450.00 special assessment. 16 
(iv) No authorizing resolution. 19 
C. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to 
Landrith's defense of waiver by the Association. 19 
D. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to 
Landrith's defense of breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by the Association. 20 
VI. INTEREST WAS NOT CALCULATED CORRECTLY IN THE 
JUDGMENT 21 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN AWARDING $403.82 
IN COSTS 24 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN ITS AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 24 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.) 
IX. IF SUCCESSFUL. LANDRITH SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 26 
ADDENDUMS: 
Addendum A - Registration of Osmond Lane Homeowners Association as a dba of Nevin 
Anderson 
Addendum B - Section 6.2 of the Declaration of Protective Covenants 
Addendum C - Proposed Jury Instruction defining "Capital Improvements" 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Beaver v. Qwest. Inc.. 2001 UT 81, 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001) 24 
Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) 25 
InreEstateofOuinn. 830 P.2d 282, 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 25 
Norman v. Arnold. 2002 UT 81, 57 P,.3d 997, (Utah 2002) 7 
Robertson's Marine. Inc. v. 14 Solutions. Inc.. 223 P.3d 1141 (Ut.App. 2010). 26 
Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking. Inc.. 2000 UT 71. 10 P.3d 338 
(Utah 2000) 6 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Utah Code Ann. Section 15-1-1(2) 21, 23 
Utah Code. Ann. Section 38-1-1 3 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 11 
iv 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING THE ASSOCIATION'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The Association's claim that it "acted as the governing body pursuant to the 
Declaration for 27 years" is not supported by the evidence. 
The Association claims that it "has acted as the governing body pursuant to the 
Declaration for twenty seven (27) years." Appellee's Brief, pg. 20. However, the 
Association does not dispute the many differences between the Association and the 
"George Osmond Estates Council" - the entity described in the Declaration. W., pp. 18-
23. Furthermore, in its Brief the Association has made no effort to explain how the 
Association could have "acted as the governing body pursuant to the Declaration for 
twenty seven (27) years" when the Association had a different name than the entity 
described in the Declaration, was a different type of entity, had a different governing 
body, had different memberships rights, had a different method of assessing fees, and had 
a different method of enforcing assessments. Id. The differences between the 
Association and the entity described in Declaration are summarized below. 
Difference between the Entity Described in the Declaration and the Association 
The Entity Described in Declaration 
The entity authorized to act under the 
Declaration is the "George Osmond 
Estates Council" See Declaration, Section 
1.1 
The "George Osmond Estates Council" 
was to be organized as a non-profit 
corporation. See Declaration, Section 
The Association 
The Association is the "Osmond Lane 
Homeowners Association" R. 30. 
The Association claims to be an 
unincorporated association. R. 30. 
1 
1.1(c). 
The "George Osmond Estates Council" 
was to be governed by a "Board of 
Managers." See Declaration, Section 
The Declaration provided that 
homeowners were to have "voting rights" 
as "specified in the Articles of 
Incorporation" for the George Osmond 
Estates Council. See Declaration, Section 
4.3. 
The George Osmond Estates Council was 
to make "annual assessments," one-half of 
which would be due on January 1 and July 
1 of each year. See Declaration, Section 
6.6. 
The George Osmond Estate Council was 
to provide copies of its articles of 
incorporation and the by-laws to all new 
purchasers of property within the 
Subdivision. See Declaration, Section 
4.2. 
The George Osmond Estates Council was 
to collect unpaid homeowners association 
fees through a "continuing lien" procedure 
described under Section 6.8 of the 
Declaration. Declaration, Section 6.8. 
The Association is governed by president, 
vice-president and secretary. See, e.g., R. 
301. 
The Association has no "Articles of 
Incorporation" and has created no 
document granting the homeowners any 
"voting rights." 
The Association makes annual 
assessments that are due in full on January 
10 of each year. R. 697. 
The Association does not provide copies 
of any articles of incorporation or any 
other organizational documents to new 
purchasers. R. 528-529, 697. 
The Association collects unpaid 
homeowners association fees by filing 
mechanic's liens. See Minutes of 
Osmond Lane Homeowners Association 
dated May 7, 1980, R. 148. ("[E]ach lot 
owner pay $100.00 for maintaining the 
center divider. This check is to be paid in 
30 days or an extra $25.00 late charge for 
the next 30 day period and then a 
mechanic's lien will be placed on the 
property.") (Emphasis added.) See also 
May 12, 1980 minutes R. 149. ("If not 
received [with the next 30 days], a 
mechanics lien will be placed on the 
property.) (Emphasis added.) 
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As evidence that the Association has "acted as the governing body pursuant to the 
Declaration for 27 years" the Association states that it has "collected assessments" from 
homeowners. Appellee's Brief, pg. 20. It is not necessary to have authority to act under a 
recorded declaration to "collect assessments." In this case, the Association has "collected 
assessments" by filing "mechanic's liens" against the property of homeowners that failed 
to pay assessments - not pursuant to the procedure set forth in the Declaration.1 See 
Appellant's Brief, pg. 7; R. 148-149. 
As evidence that the Association has "acted as the governing body pursuant to the 
Declaration for 27 years" the Association also claims that it has "enforced" the restrictive 
covenants of the Declaration. Appellee's Brief, pg. 20. However, the Association has 
failed to identify any homeowner (other than Landrith) against whom the Association has 
attempted to enforce the restrictive covenants of the Declaration. IdL, pp. 20-23. 
Finally, the Association argues that the Association is "a dba [registered] with the 
State of Utah." Id, pg. 21. In its Complaint, the Association claimed that it was an 
"unincorporated association." R. 30. In its Brief, the Association now claims it is a 
"registered dba." Appellee's Brief, pg. 21. The Association was, in fact, "registered" on 
April 22, 2002 with the Utah Department of Commerce as a dba of Nevin Anderson. See 
'Under the Declaration, assessments were to be collected through a "continuing 
lien" procedure described in Section 6.8 of the Declaration. "Mechanic's liens" are filed 
to secure payment for improving, repairing or maintaining real property pursuant to the 
Utah Mechanic's Lien Act. See Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-1 et seq. 
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Addendum A hereto. Whether the Association is an "unincorporated association" (as the 
Association claimed in the Complaint) or a "registered dba" of Nevan Anderson (as the 
Association now claims in its Brief), it is undisputed that the Association is not a "non-
profit corporation," as described in the Declaration. 
B. The Association's claim that other property owners have "recognized and 
ratified" the Association as having authority to act under the Declaration is not supported 
by the evidence. 
The Association next claims in its Brief that other property owners have 
"recognized and ratified" the Association as having authority to act under the Declaration. 
Appellee's Brief, pp. 20-21. The fact that homeowners may have paid assessments to the 
Association, or attended annual meetings, does not mean those homeowners ever 
recognized the Association as the entity described in the Declaration. As discussed 
above, the Association was not organized as the entity described in the Declaration, and 
has not operated in the same manner as the entity described in the Declaration. 
Even if this did constitute evidence that other homeowners had "recognized and 
ratified" the Association as the entity described in the Declaration, that does not mean that 
Landrith ever "recognized or ratified" the Association as the entity described in the 
Declaration. As discussed below and in Appellant's Brief, Landrith did not. See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-14, 32-33. 
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C. The Association's claim that Landrith has "ratified" the Association as having 
authority to Act under the Declaration is not supported by the evidence. 
In its Brief, the Association claims that Landrith ratified the Association's 
authority to act under Declaration since the Declaration was recorded against the Property 
at the time Landrith purchased the Property. Appellee's Brief, pg. 22. However, the 
Association was not the entity described in the Declaration. When the Association 
attempted to assert authority against Landrith under Declaration - Landrith objected: 
I do not now and have never consented to, acknowledged or 
ratified the [the Association] as having authority to make 
repairs to my property without my consent, or incur legal fees 
in connection therewith, or lien and foreclose my property to 
collect the same. 
I do not now and have never consented to, acknowledged or 
ratified the [the Association] as having authority to act as the 
George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration. 
Supplemental Affidavit of George Landrith, f 7-8, R. 697. 
The Association claims that Landrith "ratified" the Association as having authority 
to act under the Declaration since he paid homeowner fees and special assessments to the 
Association and attended one annual meeting. Appellee's Brief, pp. 21. Landrith 
recognized the Association for what it was - an association of homeowners in the 
Subdivision that was addressing common homeowners concerns, collecting annual dues 
and paying common expenses of homeowners within the Subdivision - but nothing more. 
The Association claims that Landrith "ratified" the Association as having authority 
to act under the Declaration since he reimbursed the Association for some "repairs and 
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maintenance" made to the Property. As discussed in detail in Appellant's Brief, Landrith 
reimbursed the Association for "repairs and maintenance" on two occasions - once under 
written protest2 and once under an agreement recorded by Anderson in his journal that the 
Association would make no future "repairs or maintenance" on the Property without 
Landrith's prior consent.3 Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13, 32-33. 
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, all facts and inferences must be 
reviewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Surety Underwriters v. E&C 
Trucking. Inc., 2000 UT 71, ^ 15, 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000). "[Sjummary judgment is 
appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, ^ 15, 
57 P.3d 997 (Utah 2002). 
In this case, viewing all "facts and inferences" in a light most favorable to Landrith 
- the nonmoving party on the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment - at best, there 
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Association had ever "acted as" the 
entity authorized to act under the Declaration or as to whether Landrith ever ratified the 
Association as the entity described under the Declaration. Viewing the evidence in a light 
2Landrith reimbursed the Association $1,113.50 for "repairs and maintenance" 
under a cover letter stating "my payment of this invoice is NOT any agreement on my part 
as to the legitimacy of the enclosed invoice." Appellant's Brief, pg. 12. 
3Anderson recorded in his journal that Landrith and Anderson agreed that Landrith 
would pay the Association's requested reimbursement for "repairs and maintenance," but 
only on the condition that "repairs in the future will only be done with my approval and 
prior notice and discussion with [Landrith]." Appellant's Brief, pg. 13. 
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most favorable to Landrith, there were material issues of fact in dispute and the trial court 
errored in granting the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN DENYING LANDRITH7S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Based on the undisputed facts, the Association was not the entity described in the 
Declaration. At the time it was organized, the Association chose not to organize itself as 
the entity described in the Declaration, and has operated in a manner entirely different 
than the entity described under the Declaration. The Association has not disputed the 
differences between the Association and the entity described in the Declaration. See 
Appellee's Brief, pp. 18-23. 
As a matter of law, it is not necessary to act under a recorded declaration to collect 
"assessments" or to hold annual meetings. The Association has not disputed that it has 
collected assessments by filing "mechanic's liens" - not pursuant to the collection 
procedure set forth in the Declaration. Id The Association has not disputed that it has 
never sought to enforce the restrictive covenants under the Declaration against any 
homeowner other than Landrith. Id To claim authority to act under the Declaration, at a 
minimum the Association must bear some resemblance to the entity described in 
Declaration. In this case, the Association bears no resemblance to the entity described in 
the Declaration. The trial court errored in denying Landrith's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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III. SECTION 8.4 OF THE DECLARATION IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
The Association next claims that in constructing the two retaining walls on the 
Property and suing Landrith for the cost of construction, the Association was actually 
acting pursuant to Section 8.4 of the Declaration - not as the entity described in the 
Declaration. Section 8.4 of the Declaration provides that "if any person... violates the 
provisions of this instrument, it shall be lawful for [another property owner] to institute 
proceedings at law or in equity to enforce the provisions of this instrument." Declaration, 
Section 8.4. 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment and at trial, the Association proceeded 
against Landrith under Sections 6.11 and 6.12 of the Declaration (claiming to be the 
"George Osmond Estates Council"), not as an interested property owner as described 
under Section 8.4 of the Declaration. £ee R. 472. Furthermore, Section 8.4 does not 
authorize a property owner to make repairs to another property without that property 
owner's consent, or to lien the property and foreclose on that lien to recover the cost of 
those repairs. Section 8.4 only authorizes a property owner to enforce restrictive 
covenants in the Declaration by initiating a proceeding "to enforce the provisions of [the 
Declaration]," i.e., Section 8.4 only authorizes a property owner to file an action to have 
the Court order another property owner to comply with restrictive covenants in the 
Declaration. 
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In this case, the Association did not bring an action under Section 8.4 to have the 
court order Landrith to fix the erosion. Instead, the Association fixed the erosion, 
claiming authority to do so under Section 6.11 (claiming authority to act as the George 
Osmond Estates Council), and then brought an action to foreclose the lien it had filed 
against the Property to recover the cost of repair pursuant to Section 6.12. Those actions 
could have only been undertaken by the George Osmond Estate Council (the entity 
authorized to act under the Declaration.) 
IV. THE COURT ERRORED IN EXCLUDING RILEY BRATT AS AN EXPERT 
WITNESS. 
In this case, Landrith claimed that the Association breached its duty to mitigate 
damages by building two interlocking brick retaining walls at a cost of $32,878.93, when 
the Association could have resolved the same problem by constructing a rock retaining 
wall for a much lower cost.4 The Association did not dispute Landrith's analysis that the 
Association's duty to mitigate damages included a duty to use less expensive alternative 
means to fix the erosion problem. See Appellee's Brief, pg. 30. The Association claims, 
however, that Riley Bratt did not have the requisite qualifications to testify as an expert 
witness that a rock retaining wall would have satisfactorily resolved the erosion problem 
because Bratt was not an engineer and because Bratt examined the site after the two brick 
retaining walls had been installed. Id. 
4The cost of constructing a rock retaining wall was a base cost of $7,252.00, that 
would not have exceeded $11,452.00. See Appellant's Brief, pg. 38; R. 680-82. 
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At trial, Bratt testified that he had "been building rock walls for eight years." R. 
1548, p. 286. Bratt testified that in preparation for giving his opinion he physically 
inspected the site and also reviewed the engineering plans for the two retaining walls 
constructed by the Association. R. 1548, p. 292. Mr. Bratt also attended the trial and 
listened to the testimony of Kirk Johnson, the individual that constructed the two brick 
retaining walls for the Association. Id. Mr. Bratt described other work he did in 
preparation for giving his opinion as follows: 
I got the information I needed, and I sat down and came up 
with a square foot price for this wall - how many square feet 
is going to go into a wall with - when you build a rock wall, 
you've got to make sure that you have - you've got two feet in 
the ground, and the - what happens is you've got a surcharge. 
If you have a rock wall that's built, you've got to have it so it 
has a pitch back as the other gentlemen was talking with his 
block wall. Same thing with a rock wall. You've got a 
surcharge that comes down against the wall, and you've got to 
make sure that you have a pitch on that wall, and you've got 
to make sure you have the geogrid in a row to make sure that 
that - that the weight of the earth doesn't blow out the wall. 
As I went through, I observed that this needed that. It needed 
the geogrid. It needed fabric behind the wall to make sure 
that the wall was- so that no moisture could come through 
with erosion continuing after the wall was completed. So you 
put fabric behind the rocks, and you put your geogrid in place, 
you do your excavation. 
R. 1548, pg. 288. 
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A. It was not necessary to be an engineer for Mr. Bratt to testify that a rock 
retaining wall would have satisfactorily resolved the erosion issue. 
Mr. Bratt intended to testify that the Association could have satisfactorily resolved 
the erosion problem through an alternative means (i.e., construction of a rock retaining 
wall) at a much lower cost. Mr. Bratt did not need to be an engineer to testify that a rock 
wall would have satisfactorily resolved the erosion problem or to testify as to the cost of 
constructing the rock wall. Mr. Bratt testified that he had been building rock retaining 
walls for eight years, had visited the site, had reviewed the engineering plans for the two 
retaining walls built by the Association and had listened to the testimony of the individual 
(Kirk Johnson) that had built the two brick retaining walls for the Association. 
Rule 702 only requires that Bratt be qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education." Bratt's "knowledge, skill, experience and training" and 
preparation were sufficient to qualify Bratt to testify as to whether a rock retaining wall 
would have satisfactorily resolved the erosion problem and the cost thereof. The 
Association presented no witness that testified that only an engineer could testify as to 
those issues. 
B. Mr. Bratt did not need to visit the site before the two retaining walls were 
constructed. 
The Association argues that the fact that Mr. Bratt visited the site after the two 
retaining walls had been constructed disqualified him as an expert witness. Appellee's 
11 
Brief, pg. 30. Since the two retaining walls were built before Landrith knew he would 
need an expert witness, there was no way Bratt could have inspected the site before the 
two walls were constructed. The Association presented no witness that testified that Bratt 
needed to visit the site before the construction of the two retaining walls to accurately 
form an opinion as to whether a rock retaining wall would have satisfactorily resolved the 
erosion problem. In addition to visiting the site, Bratt reviewed the engineering plans 
used to construct the walls and listened to the testimony of the person that constructed the 
two brick retaining walls. The trial court errored in refusing to allow Bratt to testify at 
trial. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING THE ASSOCIATION'S 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
A. The trial court errored in granting the Association's motion for directed verdict 
as to Landrith's defense of failure to mitigate damages. 
(i) The Association breached its duty to mitigate damages by refusing to 
allow Landrith to fix the hole. Landrith testified that he brought an independent 
contractor to the Property on July 23, 2004 to fix the erosion problem by 'Tilling the hole 
with dirt." R. 1548, pg. 346. Anderson was there and refused to allow the work to be 
done, telling Landrith that this means of repairing the hole was "no longer acceptable." 
R. 1548, pg. 346. The Association does not dispute this account, but claims that by July 
23, 2004 "an engineer was needed to inspect and repair the hole." Appellee's Brief, pg. 
30. 
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Mr. Anderson is not an engineer and as of that meeting - July 23, 2004 - no 
engineer had been hired by the Association.5 In refusing to allow Mr. Landrith to fix the 
erosion with an independent contractor on July 23, 2004, Mr. Anderson could not have 
been relying on the advise of an engineer. 
Furthermore, at trial, Steven Smith, the engineer hired by the Association, testified 
that Mr. Landrith could have filled the "hole" with dirt - and restored the landscaping to 
its original condition - without constructing two new retaining walls. Mr. Smith testified 
that, absent an "erosion plan," over a period of time, "small riverlets" would be created 
and eventually "you get back in the same situation:" 
[A]t that point you'd have to have some type of an erosion 
plan to keep the newly placed soil while - during weather 
conditions, during rain runoff, during snow runoff, and if you 
don't then small rivulets and created and eventually larger 
gullies present themselves. Eventually you get to the same 
situation. 
R. 1548, pg. 187. 
Mr. Smith did not testify that "refilling" the "hole" with dirt would not resolve the erosion 
problem. He only testified that, over time, if there was no "erosion plan," the same 
erosion problem may return. 
Thus, according to Mr. Smith, Mr. Landrith's plan would have worked - but may 
have failed at a later date if there was no erosion plan in place. If Mr. Landrith wanted to 
5Steven Smith was not hired until November, 2004. R. 1547, pg. 132; R. 1548, pp. 
165-166. 
13 
take that risk that his solution may fail over time and additional remedial action may be 
needed at a later date - that was Mr. Landrith's choice. The Association failed to 
mitigate its damages by refusing to allow Mr. Landrith to fix the erosion through the 
independent contractor that Landrith brought to the Property on July 23, 2004. 
A reasonable Jury could have concluded that the Association failed to mitigate its 
damages by refusing to allow Landrith's independent contractor to fill the "hole" in July, 
2004. The Court errored in granting the Association's motion for directed verdict on the 
mitigation of damages issue. 
(ii) Failure to use less expensive alternative means. As previously 
discussed, the trial court also errored in excluding Mr. Bratt's testimony, which would 
have provided the basis for Landrith's defense that the Association also breached its duty 
to mitigate by failing to use a less expensive alternative means to fix the erosion problem. 
B. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of 
material breach by the Association. 
(i) No approved plans. Steven Smith's engineering firm prepared plans for 
the two retaining walls constructed by the Association on the Property. The Association 
does not dispute that those plans were never submitted to the George Osmond Estates 
Architectural Board, or to any other architectural board created by the Association. 
Appellee's Brief, pg. 33. 
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The Association argues that it did not have to submit those plans to the Board 
because the Association "acquiesced to the plans by allowing the work to go forward." 
Id. Section 3.3 of the Declaration does not exempt the Association from submitting 
plans, but provides that "no wall...shall be constructed...until plans...have been submitted 
to the Board and approved in writing." The exception under Section 3.6 applies only if 
"the Board fails to approve plans...submitted to it within thirty (30) days of submission." 
"Board" is defined at the "George Osmond Estate Architectural and Planning Control 
Board." Declaration, Section 1.1(A). In this case, the Association does not dispute that it 
never submitted the plans for the walls to the Board, or to any architectural committee 
created by the Association. Appellee's Brief, pp. 32-35. 
The Declaration is a contract between the homeowners and the homeowners' 
association, and its covenants protect both parties. Appellant's Brief, pp. 42-43. If the 
Association had submitted those plans as required by Section 3.3, Landrith would have 
received notice of the meeting at which those plans were to be reviewed and would have 
had an opportunity to raise an objection to construction of the walls at that time. The 
City cannot unilaterally "acquiesce" in its own violation of the Declaration. The Jury 
could have reasonably concluded that the Association's failure to submit the plans (as 
required under both Sections 3.3 and 3.6) constituted a material breach of the Declaration, 
thereby excusing performance by Landrith. 
15 
(ii) No notice of entry of the Property. Under the Declaration, the George 
Osmond Estates Council had to first give "reasonable notice" to Landrith before entering 
the Property to perform any maintenance. Declaration, Section 6.13. Landrith testified 
that the Association did not give him any notice that it was entering the Property prior to 
construction of the two retaining walls. R. 1548, pg. 349. The Association disputes 
Landrith's testimony, claiming that notice was given. Appellee's Brief, pp. 35-36. 
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (Landrith), there was 
a material issue of fact in dispute that should have been resolved by the Jury - not by the 
Court. 
(iii) No vote authorizing the $L450.00 special assessment. Section 6.2 of 
the Declaration provides that assessments "shall be used for the...improvement and 
maintenance of the Property," but that no assessments "shall be used for capital 
improvements or expenditures" unless approved by a vote of "two-thirds of the 
membership of the Council and mortgagees:" 
The assessments levied by the Council shall be used for the 
purpose of promoting the health, safety, and welfare of the 
residents of George Osmond Estates and in particular for the 
improvement and maintenance of the Property, the services, 
and facilities devoted to this purpose and the Common Area, 
including but not limited to, the payment of taxes and 
insurance thereon and general maintenance, repair, 
replacement, and additions thereto, the cost of labor, 
equipment, materials, management, and supervision thereof. 
No assessments or fees hereunder shall be used for capital 
improvements or expenditures unless approved by a vote of 
two-thirds of the membership of the Council and mortgagees. 
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Declaration, Section 6.2. See Addendum B hereto. 
As used therein, "Property" is defined to include all "real property which...is subject to 
the Declaration."6 Declaration, First WHEREAS Clause, Section 2.1. 
In its Brief, the Association only discussed Section 6.4, making no mention of 
Section 6.2. Appellee's Brief, pp. 37-39. Section 6.2 does not limit the 2/3rd vote 
requirement to "Common Areas" - but requires a 2/3rd vote before any assessments can 
be used for "capital improvements or expenditures" "with respect to the "Property," 
which is defined as "real property which... is subject to the Declaration." Landrith's 
Property is "real property which...is subject to the Declaration," and therefore is 
"Property" within the meaning of Section 6.2, and therefore Section 6.2 requires a 2/3rd 
vote before any "capital improvements or expenditures" can be made to Landrith's 
Property. 
Landrith proposed the following Jury Instruction to assist the Jury in determining 
whether construction of the two retaining walls constituted a "capital improvements or 
expenditures" within the meaning of Section 6.2: 
[A] "capital improvement" is the addition of a permanent 
structural improvement or the restoration of some aspect of a 
property that will either enhance the property's overall value 
or increases it useful life. 
6Section 6.2 states that "assessments levied by the Council" shall be used "in 
particular for the improvement and maintenance of the Property, the services, and 
facilities and the Common Areas." "Property" is defined as "[t]he real property...which is 
subject to the Declaration." 
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R. 1368. A copy thereof is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
Steven Smith, the engineer hired by the Association, testified that the two new retaining 
walls were intended to be "stable" and withstand pressures that may "push the retaining 
wall." Id. at 169. Conrad Guymon, an engineer that also did work for the Association on 
the design for the two new retaining walls, testified that the retaining walls were intended 
to be "stable" and withstand "hydrostatic pressure." Id at 201-203. Mr. Guymon also 
testified that rebuilding the railroad tie wall "would not be a permanent solution" -
implying that the two retaining walls were a "permanent solution." Id at 211. A Jury 
could have reasonably concluded that the two retaining walls met the definition of a 
"capital improvements or expenditures," i.e. - they were "permanent structural 
improvement(s)" that "enhanced the property's overall value" - and therefore a 2/3rds 
vote was required under Section 6.2 of the Declaration. 
The Declaration is a contract between the homeowners' association and the 
homeowners, with covenants for the protection of both parties. Appellant's Brief, pp. 42-
43. Had the Association complied with Section 6.2, and held a vote, Landrith would have 
had an opportunity to argue against the construction of the two retaining walls at the time 
of that vote. Because the vote was never held, Landrith never had that opportunity, and a 
$1,450.00 "special assessment" was imposed on each homeowner to build two retaining 
walls on the Property that was never approved by the required 2/3rds vote. 
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The trial court errored in granting the Association's motion for directed verdict on 
the issue of whether the two retaining walls were "capital improvements," and therefore a 
2/3rd vote was required under Section 6.2 of the Declaration. 
(iv) No authorizing resolution. In this case, the Association produced no 
resolution at trial authorizing the construction of the two walls, or the assessment of the 
$1,450.00 special assessment to pay for the two retaining walls. Under the Association's 
theory of the case, it was acting as the "George Osmond Estates Council," a non-profit 
corporation. A corporation can act only by a resolution authorizing an action. In this 
case, the Association has produced no resolution authorizing any of the actions taken by 
the Association with respect to Landrith or the Property. Absent such a resolution, the 
Association had no authority to construct the two retaining walls, impose the $1,450.00 
special assessment or otherwise take any action with respect to Landrith or the Property.. 
C. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of 
waiver by the Association. 
In Appellee's Brief, the Association summarized Landrith's evidence of waiver as 
follows: 
Appellant raises the argument that the [the Association] has 
waived its authority to act under the Declaration, because in 
1977 the George Osmond Estates Council was organized by 
that the [the Association] did not operate pursuant to the 
Declaration. Specifically, Appellant notes that the [the 
Association] did not incorporate as a non-profit corporation, 
did not adopt any organizing document granting voting rights, 
did not give copies of its Articles of Incorporation to new 
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purchasers, and did not assess one-half (14) of the annual 
assessments on the due dates provided in the Declaration. 
Appellant thus argues that a fact finder could have found that 
the [the Association] waived its authority to act pursuant to 
the Declaration and that a directed verdict was not 
appropriate. 
Appellee's Brief, pg. 42. 
The Association then stated that Landrith "has provided no evidence" of waiver. Id. 
Clearly, there is evidence of waiver - the Association just summarized the evidence of 
waiver. A reasonable Jury could conclude that the Association waived the right to act 
under the Declaration since the Association did not organize itself as the entity described 
in the Declaration and did not operate (and has not operated) in the manner described in 
the Declaration. The trial court errored in granting the Association's motion for direct 
verdict on Landrith's defense of waiver. 
D. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by the Association. 
To find that the Association breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing with Landrith under the Declaration, a finder of fact need only find that the 
Association breached Landrith's "justified expectations" under the Declaration that were 
consistent with the "common purposes" of the Declaration. Appellant's Brief, pg. 45. 
In this case, Landrith testified that Anderson told Landrith that it would cost at 
least $100,000.00 to fix the erosion, but that if Landrith would sell the Property to him for 
$200,000.00 then Landrith would not have to worry about fixing the erosion. Appellant's 
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Brief, pg. 45-46. Landrith subsequently sold the Property for $445,000. R. 528. 
Anderson did not dispute the foregoing testimony at trial. 
A finder of fact could have concluded that Anderson was attempting to use his 
position as president of the Association to advance his own pecuniary interest by using 
the threat of the "hole" to pressure Landrith into selling the Property to him at a discount. 
There was evidence on which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the Association 
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court errored in granting the 
City's motion for directed verdict on Landrith's defense that the City had breached its 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
VI. INTEREST WAS NOT CALCULATED CORRECTLY IN THE JUDGMENT. 
In its Calculation of Interest, filed on December 12, 2008, the Association 
calculated interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2), rather than pursuant to the 
Section 6.8 of Declaration. R. 1474. In its Revised Calculation of Interest the Association 
also calculated interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). R. 1510. The Judgment 
signed by the Court and drafted by the Association also calculated interest pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). R. 1521. In its Brief, the Association provided no 
explanation as to why the Association calculated interest pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 15-1-1(2), rather than pursuant to Section 6.8 of the Declaration. 
If the Association were acting pursuant to the Declaration, it would have 
calculated interest pursuant to the Declaration. Section 6.12 of the Declaration provides 
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that "[t]he cost of exterior maintenance" shall be "added to and become part of the annual 
assessments." Section 6.6 provides that the "annual assessments" shall be "payable in 
semi-annual installments" - V2 on January 1 and lA on July 1. Section 6.8 provides that 
"[i]f the assessment is not paid within thirty (30) days of the delinquency date" it shall 
bear interest "from the date of delinquency" at the rate of 10% per annum. 
In this case, the invoice dates for the $32,878.92 claimed by the Association in its 
Notice of Lien were as follows: 
Date of invoice Amount 
5-17-05 $2,757.63 
9-25-05 $13,500.00 
11-01-05 $248.87 
12-01-05 $13,434.43 
12-01-05 $2,690.00 
12-31-05 $190.49 
R. 1510. 
According to Section 6.8 of the Declaration, one-half ($16,439.36) would have 
been due on January 1, 2006 and one-half ($16,439.36) would have been due on July 1, 
2006. Pursuant to Section 6.8, $16,439.36 would have accrued interest at 10% per annum 
from January 31, 2006 through January 12, 2009 (the date the Judgment was entered), and 
$16,439.36 would have accrued interest at 10% per annum from July 31, 2006 through 
January 12, 2009 - for a total of approximately $8,877.25 in interest.7 
Interest on the two subsequent invoices from Rainmaker of Utah (the May 15, 
2006 invoice of $74.20 and the July 15, 2008 invoice of $161.00), calculated pursuant to 
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Instead, the Association calculated interest from the date of invoice (not from the 
date of delinquency) and calculated interest under Section 15-1-1(2) for a total of 
$10,627.75, or about $1,750.50 more that if calculation pursuant to Section 6.8. 
In its Brief, the Association states that under the Declaration, assessments incurred 
in 2005 should become part of the 2005 assessment: 
Appellant's calculation wrongfully applies the exterior 
maintenance costs incurred in 2005 to the 2006 annual 
assessment costs. A careful reading of the Declaration, 
however, indicates that the exterior maintenance costs 
incurred during 2005 are due as part of the 2005 annual 
assessment. 
Appellee's Brief, pg. 46. 
The Association's analysis is wrong. The "invoice date" for $13,500 was September 25, 
2005, and the "invoice date" for $13,434.43 was December 1, 2005. How could those 
amounts have been assessed as part of the 2005 assessment, with !4 due on January 1, 
2005 and lA due on July 1, 2005, when those invoices weren't even billed until 
September and December, 2005. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN AWARDING $403.82 IN COSTS. 
In this case, the Association did not oppose Landrith's objection to $329.89 in 
costs - stating that the Association "would accept a reduction of costs...in the amount of 
$329.89." The other $74.93 was for copy costs for George Landrith's deposition (not the 
Section 6.8 the Declaration would constitute an additional $25.49 of interest, for a total of 
$8,902.74. 
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cost of George Landrith's deposition - which was claimed separately in the amount of 
$929.00). Copy costs are not recoverable as "costs." See Beaver v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 
81, 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001.) 
The Association provides no explanation as to why it submitted a Judgment to the 
Court that included costs that the Association it was "willing to reduce" - and should not 
have been awarded. The Court provided no explanation as to why it overruled an 
objection that the Association did not oppose (and agreed with). 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN ITS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The trial court awarded all fees claimed - with no analysis whatsoever. Landrith 
objected to the overall reasonableness of the attorney's fees. R. 1533. One of the 
examples cited by Landrith was billing Landrith for "training time" for a new attorney -
Aaron Lancaster. In its Brief, the Association includes evidence that was not provided to 
the trial court. Appellee's Brief, pg. 51 (.Aaron Lancaster had been licensed to practice 
law in Nevada since October of 2006 and in Utah since May of 2007.) While that may be 
true, it was not presented to the trial court. 
As cited in Appellant's Brief, In re Estate of Quinn, 830 P.2d 282, 285 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) requires findings of fact on attorneys' fees - and "[t]hose findings must be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts, to disclose the steps by which 
the trial court's decision was reached." Id at 286. The Association claims that In re 
Estate of Quinn doesn't apply since Landrith didn't provide any "evidence" to dispute the 
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reasonableness of the attorney's fees claimed by the Association. The "evidence" was set 
forth in the Objection to Form of Judgment (with Revised Calculation of Interest). R. 
1528-34. In that Objection, Landrith filed an overall objection to the reasonableness of 
attorney's fees, citing both duplication of services and "training time" as two examples of 
why the attorney's fees were unreasonable. LI at 15-29-1530. 
The Association cited Cabrera v. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) for the 
proposition that the sentence in the Judgment awarding attorney's fees is a sufficient 
"finding of fact." The Cottrell Court only held that those findings of fact may be included 
in the "findings of fact and conclusions of law" set forth as part of a Judgment, and need 
not be separate. In this case, the trial court entered no "findings of fact or conclusions of 
law" relating to its award of attorney's fees, either as part of the Judgment or separately. 
IX. IF SUCCESSFUL. LANDRITH SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
In opposition to Landrith's request for attorney's fees on appeal if successful, the 
Association only cites Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. 14 Solutions, Inc., 223 P.3d 1141 
(Ut.App. 2010), a case which is consistent with Landrith's position. In that case, the 
Court awarded attorney's fees on appeal for successfully defending an appeal on a 
contract claim, where the contract included an attorney's fees clause. In this case, the 
Declaration also includes an "attorney's fees clause." If successful on appeal, Landrith 
should also be awarded his attorney's fees. 
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Dated this '-> day of April, 2010. 
^Russell Cline, Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ij_ day of April, 2010,1 caused to be delivered 
two copies first class mail, postage pre-paid, the foregoing to: 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, L.C. 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo,UT 84603-1266 
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Addendum A - Registration of 
Osmond Lane Homeowners 
Association dba of Nevin 
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Addendum B - Section 6.2 of 
the Declaration of Protective 
Covenants 
Section 4.2 Compliance with Council Articles, ByiLaws, etc. 
Each Owner shall abide by and benefit from each provision, covenant, 
condition and restriction contained \r\ the Articles of Incorporation and 
By-Laws of the Council, a copy of which 1s provided to each" Owner at the 
time of purchase, and by which each Owner agrees to be bound* or which 
Is contained in any rule, regulation, or restriction promulgated pursuant 
to said Articles and By-Laws. The obligations, burdens, and benefits of 
membership in the Council, to the extent that they touch and concern the 
land, shall be covenants running with each Owner's Parcel for the 
benefit of all other Parcels and the Common Area. 
Section 4.3 Voting Rights. The voting rights of the members 
shall be as specified 1n the Articles of Incorporation. 
ARTICLE Y 
RIGHTS IN THE COMMON AREA 
Section 5.1 Members' Licenses of Enjoyment. Every member of 
the Council shall have an irrevocable license to enjoy the Common Area. 
Access to the private road may be controlled by a lockable gate, provided 
that said gate must meet all requirements of the City of Provo and other 
governmental agencies. 
Section 5.2 Title to Common Area. The Declarant, its successors 
and assigns shall retain the legal title to the Common Area until such 
time as it has completed improvements thereon and until such time as, in 
the opinion of the Declarant, the Council is able to maintain the same, 
but notwithstanding any provisions herein, the Declarant hereby covenants, 
for itself, its heirs and assigns, that 1t shall convey the Common Area 
to the Council not later than October 1, 1978. 
Section 5.3 Right to Transfer. The right of the Council to 
dedicate or transfer all or any part of the Common Area to any public 
agency, authority, or utility for such purposes and subject to such 
conditions as may be agreed to by the members, provided that no such 
dedication or transfer, determination as to the purposes or as to the 
conditions thereof, shall be effective unless an instrument signed by 
members entitled to cast two-thirds (2/3) of the votes has been recorded, 
agreeing to such dedication, transfer, purpose or condition, and unless 
written notice of the proposed agreement and action thereunder is sent 
to every member at least thirty (30) days in advance of any action 
taken. 
ARTICLE VI 
COVENANT FOR MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENTS 
Section 6.1 Creation of the Lien and Personal Obligation of 
Assessments. Each Owner of any Parcel by acceptance of a deed therefor, 
whether or not 1t shall be so expressed 1n any such deed or other conveyance, 
agrees to pay to the Council: (1) annual assessments or charges as 
provided herein; and (2) special assessments for capital improvements, 
such assessments to be fixed, established, and collected from time to 
time as hereinafter provided. The annual and special assessments, 
together with such interest thereon and costs of collection thereof as 
hereinafter provided, shall be a charge on the land and shall be a 
continuing lien upon the property against which each such assessment 1s 
made until paid. Each ^uch assessment, together with such interest 
thereon and cost of collection thereof as hereinafter provided, shall 
also be the personal obligation of the person who was the Owner of such 
Parcel at the time when the assessment fell due. 
Section 6.2 Purpose of Assessments. The assessments levied 
by the Council shall be used for the purpose of promoting the health,
 c 
safety, and welfare of the residents of George Osmond Estates and in | 
particular for the Improvement and maintenance of the Property, the y 
services, and facilities devoted to this purpose and the Common Area, £ 
including but not limited to, the payment of taxes and insurance thereon tf 
and general maintenance, repair, replacement, and additions thereto, the C 
cost of labor, equipment, materials, management, and supervision thereof. 
No assessments or fees hereunder shall be used for capital Improvements 
or expenditures unless approved by a vote of two-thirds of the membership 
of the Council and mortgagees. 
Section 6.3 Assessments. Annual assessments shall begin in 
the year beginning January 1, 1978. Unless changed by vote of the 
membership, the maximum annual assessment for any Parcel shall be $200.00 
per year. The Board of Managers of the Council may, after consideration 
of the current maintenance costs and the financial requirements of the 
Council, fix the actual assessment at an amount less than the maximum. 
The maximum annual assessment may be charged as follows: 
A. From and after January 1, 1978, the maximum annual 
assessment may be Increased each year not more than 10% above 
the maximum assesn?ent for the previous year without a vote of 
the membership. 
B. From and after January 1, 1978, the maximum annual 
assessment may be increased above 10% by a vote of one-half 
(1/2) of the members who are voting 1n person or by proxy, at 
a meeting duly called for this purpose. 
C. The Board of Managers may fix the annual assessment 
at an amount n-jt 1n excess of the maximum. 
Written notice of any meeting of members called to change the 
maximum annual assessment shall be sent to all members at least thirty 
(30) days in advance of the date of such meeting, setting forth the 
purposes of the meeting. 
Section 6.4 Special Assessments for Capital Improvements. 
In addition to the annual assessments authorized by Section 6.3 hereof, 
the Board of Managers of the Council may levy a special assessment for 
the purpose of defraying, In whole or in part, the cost of any construction 
or reconstruction, unexpected repair or replacement of any capital 
improvements upon the Common Area, including the necessary fixtures and 
personal property related thereto, provided that any such assessment 
shall have the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the votes of the Council 
who are voting in person or by proxy at a meeting duly called for this 
purpose, written notice of which shall be sent to all members at least 
thirty (30) days in advance and shall set forth the purpose of the 
meeting. 
Section 6.5 Quorum. A quorum for any action authorized under 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 hereof shall be as follows: 
At the first meeting called, as provided in Sections 6.3 and 
6.4 hereof, the presence at the meeting of members, or of 
proxies entitled to cast sixty percent (60%) of all votes of 
the Council shall constitute a quorum. If the required quorum 
1s not forthcoming at any meeting, another meeting may be 
called, subject to the notice requirements set forth in Sections 
6.3 and 6.4 and the required quorum at any such subsequent 
meeting shall be one-half of the required quorum at the 
preceding meeting, provided that no such subsequent meeting 
shall be held more than sixty (60) days following the preceding 
meeting. 
Section 6.6 Payment of Annual Assessments: Due Dates. The 
annual assessments provided for herein shall be payable in semi-annual 
installments (1/2 of the annual assessment) on the first day of each 
January and July of each year. The due date of any special assessments 
under Section 6.4 hereof shall be fixed in the resolution authorizing 
such assessment. 
Section 6.7 Duties of the Council. The Council shall, at 
least ten (10) days in advance of the assessment date or period, prepare 
a roster of the properties and assessments applicable thereto which 
shall be kept in the office of the Council and shall be open to inspection 
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Addendum £ - Proposed Jury 
Instruction defining "Capital 
Improvements" 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
An "capital improvement" is the addition of a permanent 
structural improvement or the restoration of some aspect of a 
property that will either enhance the property's overall value or 
increases its useful life. 
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